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CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Open the Floodgates to Public Parks:
The Tenth Circuit Welcomes All to Put Up Personal Permanent
Monuments; Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044
(10th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008).
*OSHUA 4OLIN

INTRODUCTION
Pleasant Grove, a small city in Utah, has numerous parks, one of which,
Pioneer Park, contains historical buildings, statues, and artifacts.1 Among those
displays stand the town’s ﬁrst city hall and ﬁre department, a pioneer era school
house, and a granite stone from the ﬁrst Mormon temple, recognizing the
community’s ﬁrst settlers.2 Pioneer Park also contains a monument depicting the
Ten Commandments, donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles and placed in the
park in 1971.3
Approximately forty miles away, in Salt Lake City, is the headquarters for
Summum, a non-proﬁt religious group.4 In September 2003, Summum formally
requested that Pleasant Grove allow the erection of a monument containing
the Seven Aphorisms of Summum in Pioneer Park.5 Summum proposed its
monument be similar in size and nature to the Ten Commandments monument
already present in the park.6 The mayor denied Summum’s request, explaining

* M.B.A., Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2010. I would like to thank my teachers,
friends, and family for the many lessons and continued support. Special thanks to Professor Lisa
Rich for her assistance with this note.
1

Summum v. Pleasant Grove City (0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007).

2

Id.

3

Id. Throughout the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s, the Eagles donated similar monuments to communities across the United States in an effort to promote morals to America’s youth. Summum v.
Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 2002).
4
0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1047. Corky Nowell founded Summum as a non-proﬁt
organization in 1975. Keenan Lorenz, Survey, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City 4HE 4ENTH #IRCUIT
h"INDS THE (ANDS OF ,OCAL 'OVERNMENTS AS 4HEY 3HAPE THE 0ERMANENT #HARACTER OF 4HEIR 0UBLIC
Spaces,v 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 638 n.73 (2008). Mr. Nowell founded Summum after he started
experiencing encounters with aliens (“Beings”). Id. Mr. Nowell continued having these encounters
and legally changed his name to Summum Bonum Amon Ra, the name the Beings called him.
Welcome to Summum, http://www.summum.us/about/welcome.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
The Beings introduced Mr. Nowell to the principles of Summum. Id.
5
0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1047. Summum’s philosophy includes seven aphorisms:
Psychokinesis, Correspondence, Vibration, Opposition, Rhythm, Cause and Effect, and Gender.
Lorenz, supra note 4, at 638 n.73.
6

0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1047.
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all permanent displays in the park must directly relate to the city’s history or be
donated by community groups.7 Summum met neither of these requirements,
but still made a second proposal attempt, which the city again denied.8 Summum
then ﬁled suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, claiming
the city violated Summum’s First Amendment right to free speech.9
The district court denied Summum’s request for a preliminary injunction
requiring the city to display its monument in the park, and Summum subsequently
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.10 The Tenth
Circuit, sitting in panel, reversed the district court’s ruling and held the following:
(1) the donated Ten Commandments monument constitutes the private speech
of the Eagles, as opposed to the governmental speech of the city; (2) the city
park constitutes a traditional public forum, which requires any discriminatory
content-based decisions be subjected to strict scrutiny review; and (3) the city
did not meet this heightened standard and unconstitutionally discriminated
against Summum’s speech.11 Accordingly, the court required Pleasant Grove
to allow Summum to display the Seven Aphorisms monument.12 In an evenly
split decision, the Tenth Circuit denied rehearing en banc.13 The United States
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari.14
If the United States Supreme Court does not reverse the Tenth Circuit’s
decision, the City of Pleasant Grove will not be the only governmental entity
affected.15 Afﬁrming the Tenth Circuit’s decision will effectively force the City
of Casper, Wyoming to permit Pastor Fred Phelps to build a ﬂagrantly anti-

7

Id.

8

Id. While Summum maintains its headquarters in nearby Salt Lake City, the group claims no
ties with the City of Pleasant Grove. See id. Summum also does not claim its monument relates to
the history of the city. See id.
9

Id. For information on the Ten Commandments and the Establishment Clause, see generally
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.2 (3d ed. 2006); 5
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, NOWAK AND ROTUNDA’S TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 21.3 (4th ed. 2008); Antony Barone Kolenc, h-R 3CALIAS
.EIGHBORHOODv ! (OME FOR -INORITY 2ELIGIONS, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 819 (2007); Haynes Maier
& Eric R. Mull, Casenote, (OLY -OSES 7HAT $O 7E $O WITH THE 4EN #OMMANDMENTS, 57 MERCER
L. REV. 645 (2006).
10

0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1048.

11

Id. at 1047 n.2, 1050, 1057.

12

Id. at 1057.

13

Summum v. Pleasant Grove City (0LEASANT 'ROVE ))), 499 F.3d 1170, 1171 (10th Cir.

2007).
14

Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum (0LEASANT 'ROVE )))), 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008). The
United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments on November 12, 2008. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 1, 0LEASANT 'ROVE ))), 128 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 07-665). However, the Court has yet to
issue an opinion on the case.
15

See infra notes 182–91 and accompanying text.
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homosexual statue condemning one of the city’s former residents.16 Moreover,
failure to reverse would prohibit governments at all levels across the country from
regulating their public lands.17
This case note argues the Tenth Circuit erroneously decided Summum v.
0LEASANT 'ROVE #ITY (0LEASANT 'ROVE )) in favor of Summum.18 First, this note
introduces the panel’s decision in 0LEASANT 'ROVE ) and the opinions of Summum
V 0LEASANT 'ROVE #ITY (0LEASANT 'ROVE ))), in which the Tenth Circuit denied
rehearing en banc.19 Second, this note analyzes the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on
3UMMUM V /GDEN, which held a privately-donated monument remains the speech
of the donor.20 Third, it analyzes the panel’s holding that a public park constitutes
a traditional public forum for the erection of permanent monuments.21 This note
demonstrates the Tenth Circuit erred in its First Amendment analysis and the
United States Supreme Court should reverse the Tenth Circuit’s decision.22

BACKGROUND
The First Amendment provides “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”23 The United States Supreme Court, however, has expressly
stated the United States Constitution does not protect this right absolutely.24
As such, the government can regulate speech, but courts must determine when
regulation violates the Constitution.25
When a government restricts speech on government property, a reviewing
court follows a multi-step framework to determine whether the restriction violates
the individual’s right to freedom of speech.26 First, the court determines who
speaks on the government property.27 When the government speaks, the United
States Constitution entitles it to make content-based decisions and engage in
viewpoint-based decision making.28 However, when dealing with private speech,

16

See infra notes 182–88 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 80–199 and accompanying text.

19

See infra notes 80–109 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 110–53 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 154–99 and accompanying text.

22

See infra notes 110–99 and accompanying text.

23

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

24

Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961).

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 924–25. See generally Nelson Tebbe, %XCLUDING 2ELIGION, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2008).
25

26

See infra notes 31–73 and accompanying text.

27

See infra notes 31–45 and accompanying text.

28

See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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the reviewing court conducts a forum analysis to determine the constitutional
validity of the exclusion.29 Depending on the forum classiﬁcation, the court
uses the applicable standard to determine if the exclusion satisﬁes constitutional
requirements.30

'OVERNMENT VS 0RIVATE 3PEECH
In a free speech case, a court ﬁrst decides who speaks on the government
property, the government itself or a private individual.31 To make this determination,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applies a four-factor test
adopted from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.32 The
Eighth Circuit developed the four-factor test in Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v.
#URATORS OF THE 5NIVERSITY OF -ISSOURI, and the Tenth Circuit ﬁrst adopted the test
in 7ELLS V #ITY  #OUNTY OF $ENVER.33
The United States Supreme Court has not adopted a speciﬁc framework for
this determination, but in *OHANNS V ,IVESTOCK -ARKETING !SSOCIATION, the Court
held a beef advertising campaign constituted government speech.34 While the
Court did not specify the test used, its analysis included factors similar to those
in the four-factor test.35 The Court assessed the purpose of the program, who
had editorial control of the speech, and who exercised ultimate control over the
advertising campaign.36
29

See infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.

30

See infra notes 50–73 and accompanying text.

31

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985). If a court
classiﬁes the speech at issue as private, the court then completes a forum analysis to determine the
degree to which the government can restrict access. Id. However, if a court classiﬁes the speech
as governmental, the United States Constitution entitles the government to make content-based
decisions and engage in viewpoint-based decision making. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); see infra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (explaining
restrictions on government speech).
32
Summum v. Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1004 (10th Cir. 2002). Prior to adopting the fourfactor test, the Tenth Circuit had no formal framework to determine speech ownership. See Wells
v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140–42 (10th Cir. 2001). Previously, however, in
Summum v. Callaghan, the Tenth Circuit—without analysis—characterized a privately-donated Ten
Commandments monument as private speech. 130 F.3d 906, 919 n.19 (10th Cir. 2002).
33

Wells, 257 F.3d at 1140–42 (adopting the four-factor test to determine a “Happy Holidays”
sign erected by the government represents governmental speech for the purposes of free speech
analysis); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093–94
(8th Cir. 2000) (developing the four-factor test to determine state-sponsored radio announcements
recognizing private donors constitute government speech).
34

544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005).

35

Ariz. Life Coalition, Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008) (adopting the
four-factor test after recognizing the United States Supreme Court followed similar reasoning in
Johanns); see Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61.
36

Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61.
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The Wells Factors
Because the United States Supreme Court has not clearly speciﬁed how to
make this determination, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
uses the test it adopted in Wells.37 Whether the speech belongs to the government
or another relevant actor depends on the balancing of the following four factors:
(1) the central purpose of the government program in which the speech occurs,
(2) the amount of editorial control over the content, (3) the identity of the literal
speaker, and (4) with whom ultimate responsibility of the content rests.38 In
addition to the Tenth and Eighth Circuits, the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits apply this four-factor test.39
Shortly after adopting this four-factor test, the Tenth Circuit, in Summum
V /GDEN, applied it to a Ten Commandments monument donated by the Eagles
and displayed on municipal grounds.40 In analyzing the ﬁrst factor, the court held
the central purpose of the monument was to promote the views of the donors.41
In assessing the second factor of the Wells test, the court recognized the Eagles,
and not the city, exercised complete control over designing the entirety of the
monument, including its content.42 While recognizing the city may have become
the literal speaker after accepting the donation, under the third Wells factor,
the court concluded the Eagles constituted the literal speaker of the text on the
monument.43 In addressing the ﬁnal Wells factor, the court recognized Ogden
became the true owner of the monument when the city accepted the donation.44
In sum, the court concluded the Ten Commandments monument represented the
speech of the Eagles, and not that of the city government.45

Free Speech Fora
If a court classiﬁes the speech at issue as private, the court then completes a
forum analysis to determine which speech the government can exclude from the

37

/GDEN, 297 F.3d at 1004.

38

Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141.

39

%G, !RIZ ,IFE, 515 F.3d at 964–65; Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va.
Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618–19 (4th Cir. 2002).
40

/GDEN, 297 F.3d at 1004–05.

41

Id. at 1004.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 1005.

45

/GDEN, 297 F.3d at 1005 (recognizing three of the four factors support the ﬁnding of private
speech).
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property.46 In doing so, the court considers both the government property at issue
and the type of access sought by the excluded speaker.47 Once the court identiﬁes
the forum in question, it then determines the proper forum classiﬁcation, as the
United States Supreme Court set forth in 0ERRY %DUCATION !SSOCIATION V 0ERRY
,OCAL %DUCATORS !SSOCIATION.48 The 0ERRY court distinguished three categories:
the traditional public forum, the designated public forum, and the nonpublic
forum.49

4RADITIONAL 0UBLIC &ORA
The United States Constitution affords the most protection to individual
rights in the ﬁrst 0ERRY classiﬁcation, the traditional public forum.50 Traditional
public fora include those places which have always been reserved for the public’s
use.51 This category includes public streets and parks, because the public has
historically used them in order to assemble, communicate, and discuss issues.52
In traditional public fora, the government cannot make content-based exclusions
without satisfying a strict level of scrutiny by proving that such regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest.53 Furthermore, to satisfy strict
scrutiny, the exclusion must be narrowly drawn to protect that interest.54 The
Constitution, however, does not completely prohibit government from regulating
speech on public property.55 In traditional public fora (as well as designated and
nonpublic fora), the government may enact time, place, and manner of expression
regulations, so long as they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a
signiﬁcant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.56

46
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797. Forum analysis is only required for protected speech on
government property. Id. If the proposed speech represents a type of unprotected or less-protected
speech, e.g., obscenity, libel, or commercial speech, different standards apply and a forum analysis
is unnecessary. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 9, § 20.1.
47

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797.

48

460 U.S. 37, 45–47 (1983).

49

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (citing 0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 45–47).

50

0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 45.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). A government makes content-based
exclusions when it restricts access to a forum based on the subject matter of the speech excluded or
on the identity of the individual trying to speak. Id. at 49. For example, Pleasant Grove required
that Pioneer Park monuments relate to the history of the town (subject matter) or be donated by
an individual or group with long-standing ties to the community (speaker identity). Summum v.
Pleasant Grove City (0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 483 F.3d 1044, 1052 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007).
54

0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 45.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 45–46.
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$ESIGNATED 0UBLIC &ORA
The 0ERRY court recognized a second classiﬁcation, the designated public
forum.57 A government creates a designated public forum, and this type of
forum carries with it the same use protections as those associated with traditional
public fora.58 In order to create a designated public forum, the government
must intentionally open a nonpublic forum for the purpose of free speech.59 For
example, the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee created a designated public forum
when it opened a municipal theater for use by its citizens.60 Nothing requires a
government to create these fora.61 However, even if it chooses to do so, nothing
requires a government to keep them open indeﬁnitely.62 As long as a government
keeps a designated public forum open to the public, the courts will use the
standard of review applicable to traditional public fora.63

Nonpublic Fora
Lastly, the 0ERRY court recognized a residual category of public property, the
nonpublic forum.64 A nonpublic forum includes any public property not considered
a traditional public forum or designated by the government as a public forum.65
An army base, for example, represents a nonpublic forum.66 Nonpublic fora carry
with them different standards of regulation.67 In addition to the time, place, and

57

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; SEE 0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 45.

58

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.

59

Id. (“The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited
discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”); see
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757 (1995) (plaza opened for free
speech by statute).
60
0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), as an
example of a designated public forum); SEE 3E 0ROMOTIONS, 420 U.S. at 555 (recognizing city created
a public forum when it opened a municipal theater for use by the public and unconstitutionally
excluded a theater company by refusing to permit the performance of the musical “Hair” at the
public theater).
61

0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 45–46.

62

Id.

63

Id. If a government does not want a court to apply the traditional public forum standards
to a designated public forum, it can revert the forum back to a nonpublic forum by removing the
public’s access. Id. A traditional public forum, however, cannot be changed into another forum
type. Id. at 45.
64

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; 0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 46.

65

0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 46.

66

Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836–37 (1976).

67

Id.
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manner regulations permitted for each of the forum types, in a nonpublic forum,
the government may utilize more expansive (i.e., content-based) exclusions, as
long as they are both reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.68

,IMITED 0UBLIC &ORA
While the 0ERRY court categorized only three forum types, federal courts have
developed a fourth label, the limited public fora.69 At times, courts use this label
when referring to a designated public forum; at other times, courts treat limited
public fora as a type of nonpublic fora.70 Recently, the United States Supreme
Court used “limited public forum” when applying the less restrictive standard
reserved for 0ERRY’s third category, nonpublic fora.71 In !RKANSAS %DUCATIONAL
Television Commission v. Forbes, the Court clariﬁed that a public forum is
designated when “generally open” to the public or speciﬁc classes of groups, but is
a nonpublic forum when the government allows merely “selective access.”72 The
classiﬁcation of limited public forum, therefore, refers to a nonpublic forum the
government opened for selective access, requiring restrictions to be reasonable and
not viewpoint-based.73

68
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981); Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 806.
69
%G, Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993)
(“The school property, when not in use for school purposes, was neither a traditional or designated
public forum; rather it was a limited public forum . . . .”); Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 914–15 (“We use
the term ‘limited public forum’ here to denote a particular species of nonpublic forum . . . .”).
70
Compare Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (applying
viewpoint discrimination and reasonableness test to limited public forum), WITH Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 272 (1981) (applying strict scrutiny to limited public forum).
71

Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 914–15; e.g., 'OOD .EWS, 533 U.S. at 106–07; 2OSENBERGER, 515
U.S. at 829–30; ,AMBS #HAPEL, 508 U.S. at 390, 393–94; see W. Brent Woodall, Fixing the Faulty
&ORUM &RAMEWORK #HANGING THE 7AY #OURTS !NALYZE &REE 3PEECH #ASES, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 295,
307 (2004) (“Thus, in 'OOD .EWS #LUB the Court once again rejected the guidance of 0ERRY and
indicated that a limited public forum is a type of nonpublic forum.”).
72
523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998). For example, in Widmar, the only United States Supreme Court
decision treating a limited public forum as a designated public forum, a university kept its facilities
generally open to all student groups. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272. However, in the most recent
United States Supreme Court decisions involving limited public fora, the government merely
granted selective access, and the Court has treated such fora as nonpublic. %G, 'OOD .EWS, 533
U.S. at 106 (facility access for limited purposes during limited after-school hours); 2OSENBERGER, 515
U.S. at 832 (publication funding for speciﬁc subset of student organizations); ,AMBS #HAPEL, 508
U.S. at 389–90 (facility access for limited purposes during limited after-school hours).
73
Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 916; Mary Jean Dolan, 4HE 3PECIAL 0UBLIC 0URPOSE &ORUM AND
%NDORSEMENT 2ELATIONSHIPS .EW %XTENSIONS OF 'OVERNMENT 3PEECH, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 77
(2004). But see Woodall, supra note 71, at 313–15 (recognizing the United States Supreme Court’s
recent decisions and arguing for a return to the original 0ERRY framework, wherein courts treat
limited public fora as a species of designated public fora).
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Summum and the Constitutionality of the Ten Commandments
Summum ﬁrst began its legal crusade against government-displayed Ten
Commandments monuments in 1994.74 In Summum v. Callaghan, Salt Lake
County allowed the Eagles to install a Ten Commandments monument on
the lawn outside the county courthouse.75 In its complaint, Summum alleged
violation of the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Due Process Clauses of the
United States Constitution.76 Since ﬁling its ﬁrst complaint, Summum has ﬁled
lawsuits claiming Establishment Clause and Freedom of Speech Clause violations
against multiple Utah municipal and county governments.77
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court decided 6AN /RDEN V 0ERRY,
in which it held Texas’ display of a privately-donated Ten Commandments
monument on government property did not violate the Establishment Clause.78
Since the Court’s decision in 6AN /RDEN effectively closed the door on the Ten
Commandments and Establishment Clause claims, Summum narrowed its claims
to the freedom of speech.79

PRINCIPAL CASE
United States District Court for the District of Utah
3UMMUM V 0LEASANT 'ROVE #ITY (0LEASANT 'ROVE )) presented the question
of whether a city violated an organization’s free speech rights under the United
States Constitution.80 Summum, a religious group, argued Pleasant Grove
unconstitutionally denied its request to erect a permanent monument espousing
its Seven Aphorisms in Pioneer Park, a public municipal park.81 Summum claimed
this violated the Constitution because the city, at the same time, displayed other

74

Freedom of Speech, http://www.summum.us/about/freespeech.shtml (last visited Nov. 17,

2008).
75

Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 909–10.

76

Id. at 910.

77

3EE 0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1047; Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263, 1267
(10th Cir. 2007); /GDEN, 297 F.3d at 999; Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 911.
78

545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005).

79

See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum (0LEASANT 'ROVE )))), 128 S. Ct. 1737, 1737
(2008); 0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1048; Alberto B. Lopez, %QUAL !CCESS AND THE 0UBLIC &ORUM
0INETTES )MBALANCE OF &REE 3PEECH AND %STABLISHMENT, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 167, 209 (2003) (“In fact,
the free speech strategy has proven effective with judges across the ideological spectrum against
opponents who rely on the First Amendment’s clause against the establishment of religion.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
80

483 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007).

81

Id.; see supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text (providing background information on the
religion of Summum).
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privately-donated statues, including a Ten Commandments monument.82 The
United States District Court for the District of Utah denied an oral motion for a
preliminary injunction to force display of Summum’s proposed monument, and
Summum appealed the ruling.83

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Sitting in panel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court, holding Pleasant Grove violated Summum’s
constitutionally guaranteed rights to free speech.84 The court’s decision was
threefold: (1) a donated Ten Commandments monument, which sat in the
park, constitutes the private speech of its donors; (2) the city park constitutes a
traditional public forum, which requires the court to subject any content-based
decisions to strict scrutiny; and (3) Pleasant Grove failed to meet this heightened
standard of scrutiny.85
The Tenth Circuit cited two of its previous decisions, 3UMMUM V /GDEN and
Summum v. Callaghan, when it concluded the Ten Commandments monuments
remain the private speech of its donors.86 In Callaghan, the Tenth Circuit
concluded a similarly donated Ten Commandments monument involved private
speech, as it expressed the views of its donors.87 Five years later in /GDEN, the
Tenth Circuit applied the four-factor Wells test it had since adopted to conclude
the Ten Commandments monument did not constitute governmental speech, but
the private speech of the donors.88
After dispensing with the private speech characterization in a footnote, the
0LEASANT 'ROVE ) court conducted a forum analysis to determine the appropriate

82

0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1047.

83

Id. at 1048.

84

Id. at 1057.

85

Id. at 1047 n.2, 1050, 1057.

86

Id. at 1047 n.2. Both cases involved a similar Ten Commandments monument located
on government property and Summum’s attempts to display its own monument. See Summum v.
Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 999 (10th Cir. 2002) (Ten Commandments displayed on municipal building
grounds); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 909–10 (10th Cir. 1997) (Ten Commandments
displayed on county courthouse lawn).
87

Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 919 n.19.

88

/GDEN, 297 F.3d at 1006. Between Callaghan and /GDEN, the Tenth Circuit decided Wells
V #ITY  #OUNTY OF $ENVER, in which it adopted a test from the Eighth Circuit to determine when
it classiﬁes speech as private as opposed to governmental. See Wells v. City & County of Denver,
257 F.3d 1132, 1140–42 (10th Cir. 2001) (adopting the four-factor test); Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 2000) (developing the
four-factor test).
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level of scrutiny to apply to the city’s denial of Summum’s request.89 The court
identiﬁed the forum in question as the “permanent monuments in the city park.”90
Once the court determined the relevant forum, it then turned to classifying the
forum into one of the three original 0ERRY classiﬁcations: (1) traditional public
forum, (2) designated public forum, or (3) nonpublic forum.91
In determining the relevant classiﬁcation, the Tenth Circuit noted the district
court incorrectly categorized the monuments in the city park as a nonpublic forum
because it applied the reasonable and viewpoint-neutral test.92 The Tenth Circuit,
instead, classiﬁed the monuments in the park as a traditional public forum.93 The
court reasoned that because of the forum’s location inside a city park, which the
United States Supreme Court characterized as a traditional public forum, the
Pleasant Grove forum constituted—by default—a traditional public forum.94
Once the Tenth Circuit determined the monuments in the park to be a
traditional public forum, it reviewed Pleasant Grove’s speech restrictions based
on the corresponding level of review, strict scrutiny.95 As Pleasant Grove based
its exclusions on subject matter and speaker identity, the city conceded it made
content-based exclusions.96 In applying this heightened level of scrutiny, the court

89
0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1047 n.2, 1050. The panel did not speciﬁcally characterize
the monuments in Pioneer Park as private speech. Id. at 1047 n.2. Before reaching the discussion
section of its decision, the Tenth Circuit mentioned in a background footnote that it had previously
characterized a similar donated Ten Commandments monument as private speech. Id. In its
discussion, the Tenth Circuit skipped the Wells test and applied the forum analysis posthaste. Id.
at 1050.
90

Id. at 1050.

91

Id.

92

Id. Courts apply this test to nonpublic fora; a reviewing court will hold content-based
exclusions constitutional if it considers the exclusions both reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). The Tenth Circuit,
however, failed to recognize the United States Supreme Court’s and its own holdings that this
standard applies also to limited public fora. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (accepting parties’ classiﬁcation of limited public forum and applying
viewpoint discrimination and reasonableness test to limited public forum); Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995) (applying viewpoint discrimination
and reasonableness test to limited public forum); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390, 393–94 (1993) (accepting lower court’s classiﬁcation of limited
public forum and applying reasonableness standard); Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 916 (“Regulations of
speech in a nonpublic or limited public forum are subject to the more deferential reasonableness
standard.”).
93

0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1050.

94

Id. at 1050–51; see Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(classifying public streets and parks as traditional public fora).
95

0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1052–53.

96

Id. at 1052, 1052 n.5.
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held Pleasant Grove’s interest in promoting its history was not compelling.97
Alternatively, even if Pleasant Grove possessed a compelling interest, its exclusion
was not necessary and narrowly drawn to serve that interest.98 As such, the court
held Pleasant Grove’s speech restrictions violated the United States Constitution.99
The panel concluded the trial court should have granted the preliminary injunction
and ordered the city to allow erection of Summum’s proposed monument.100

0ETITION FOR 0ANEL 2EHEARING AND 2EHEARING %N "ANC
Pleasant Grove subsequently ﬁled a petition for panel rehearing and a petition
for rehearing en banc in 3UMMUM V 0LEASANT 'ROVE #ITY (0LEASANT 'ROVE ))).101
The original panel denied rehearing, and the court denied rehearing en banc by
an evenly split six-to-six vote.102

$ISSENTING /PINION *UDGE ,UCERO
Judge Lucero ﬁled a dissenting opinion from the denial of rehearing en
banc, in which he agreed the application of the Wells test indicated the Ten
Commandments monument remains the private speech of the Eagles.103 Judge
Lucero, however, concluded the permanent monuments in the park represented a
nonpublic forum, not a traditional public forum.104

$ISSENTING /PINION *UDGE -C#ONNELL JOINED BY *UDGE 'ORUSCH
Judge McConnell also ﬁled a dissenting opinion from the denial of rehearing
en banc, in which Judge Gorsuch joined.105 Judge McConnell disagreed with the
97

Id. at 1053.

98

Id. (“As the [United States] Supreme Court has explained, deﬁning a governmental interest
this narrowly (i.e., the promotion of the city’s history in this particular park) turns the effect of the
regulation into the governmental interest.”) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 120 (1991) (“[T]his sort of circular defense can sidestep
judicial review of almost any statute, because it makes all statutes look narrowly tailored.”)).
99

Id. at 1054 (evaluating likely merits of the case based on procedural posture).

100

0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1057.

101

499 F.3d 1170, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007).

102

Id. The original panel included Chief Judge Tacha, Judge Ebbel, and Judge Kane, sitting
by designation from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 0LEASANT 'ROVE ),
483 F.3d at 1045. The active judges hearing the en banc petitions included Chief Judge Tacha and
Judges Kelly, Henry, Briscoe, Lucero, Murphy, Hartz, O’Brien, McConnell, Tymkovich, Gorsuch,
and Holmes. 0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1170. The Tenth Circuit local rules require a majority of
the active judges to order a rehearing en banc; therefore, an equally divided vote allowed the lower
decision to stand. Id. at 1171.
103

0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1172 (Lucero, J., dissenting).

104

Id. at 1173–74.

105

Id. at 1174 (McConnell, J., dissenting).
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court’s holding that the donated monuments remain the private speech of the
donors.106 Judge McConnell further explained that once the court recognizes the
statues as government speech, the need for a forum analysis disappears.107

2ESPONSE TO THE $ISSENTING /PINIONS #HIEF *UDGE 4ACHA
Chief Judge Tacha then took the self-described “unprecedented step” of
responding to the dissents from the denial of rehearing en banc to reinforce the
original panel’s decision, which she authored.108 Writing separately in her response
to the dissents, Chief Judge Tacha reiterated the panel’s holdings that privatelydonated monuments remain the private speech of the donors and a city park
constitutes a traditional public forum for the erection of monuments.109

ANALYSIS
In 3UMMUM V 0LEASANT 'ROVE #ITY (0LEASANT 'ROVE )), the Tenth Circuit made
two major errors in its ultimate conclusion.110 The Tenth Circuit incorrectly relied
on its previous holdings that privately-donated monuments remain the private
speech of the donors for First Amendment purposes.111 Had it applied the Wells
four-factor test to the facts, the court would have concluded the privately-donated
Ten Commandments monument constitutes governmental speech.112 Even if the
court had not applied the Wells test to hold the speech governmental, following
a thorough forum analysis, it should have determined a city park constitutes a
nonpublic forum for the erection of monuments, requiring the court to apply a
lesser standard of review.113

0RIVATE 3PEECH VS 'OVERNMENT 3PEECH
In its ﬁrst of three substantive holdings in this case, the Tenth Circuit
characterized the Ten Commandments monument as the private speech of its
donors, as opposed to the governmental speech of the city that acquired it.114 The
panel conducted no analysis of its own, but cited two of its previous decisions,

106

Id. at 1177.

107

Id.

108

0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1178 (Tacha, C.J., responding to dissents).

109

Id. at 1178–82.

110

See infra notes 114–99 and accompanying text.

111

See infra notes 114–34 and accompanying text.

112

See infra notes 134–53 and accompanying text.

113

See infra notes 154–99 and accompanying text.

114

Summum v. Pleasant Grove City (0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 n.2 (10th Cir.
2007). Because Summum sought access to display its Seven Aphorisms monument in Pioneer
Park, where the government already displayed some monuments, the court must determine if the
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Summum v. Callaghan and 3UMMUM V /GDEN.115 However, those decisions do
not create a sound basis for the holding in 0LEASANT 'ROVE ), as one case lacked
analysis on the issue and the other misapplied the test for determining speech
ownership.116
In 7ELLS V #ITY  #OUNTY OF $ENVER, the Tenth Circuit adopted a test from the
Eighth Circuit to characterize speech as governmental or private in nature.117 The
Wells test determines whether the speech in question belongs to the government
or another relevant actor by weighing the following four factors: (1) the central
purpose of the program in which the speech occurs, (2) the amount of editorial
control the government exercises over the content, (3) the identity of the literal
speaker, and (4) with whom ultimate responsibility of the content rests.118
The Tenth Circuit, however, adopted the Wells test to resolve speech
ownership questions after it decided Callaghan; therefore, Callaghan should
not be determinative on this issue.119 Moreover, the Callaghan court performed
no speech ownership analysis; it simply stated that the Ten Commandments
monument represented private speech expressing the views of its donors.120
Five years later in /GDEN, the Tenth Circuit used the Wells four-factor test to
characterize the ownership of the speech in question.121 After applying the test, the
/GDEN court concluded Ogden’s Ten Commandments monument represented the
current displays constitute governmental or private speech. See Wells v. City & County of Denver,
257 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 2001). The Tenth Circuit focused on the privately-donated Ten
Commandments monument displayed in Pioneer Park, as the facts surrounding this donation were
the most developed. 3EE 0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1047–48.
115

0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1047 n.2. Both cases dealt with a similar Ten Commandments
monument placed on government property and Summum seeking to remove the Ten Commandments
or display its own monument on the same property. Summum v. Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 999 (10th
Cir. 2002) (Ten Commandments on municipal building grounds); Summum v. Callaghan, 130
F.3d 906, 909–10 (10th Cir. 1997) (Ten Commandments on county courthouse lawn).
116

Summum v. Pleasant Grove City (0LEASANT 'ROVE ))), 499 F.3d 1170, 1176, 1176 n.1 (10th
Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., dissenting); see infra notes 119–34 and accompanying text (demonstrating
Callaghan’s lack of analysis and /GDEN’s misapplication of the Wells test); see also /GDEN, 297 F.3d
at 1000 n.3 (explaining the Tenth Circuit’s precedent with respect to one municipality’s display
of a similar Ten Commandments monument does not control the constitutionality of another
municipality’s display).
117

257 F.3d at 1140–42.

118

Id.; Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093–94
(8th Cir. 2000).
119
3EE 0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1176. See generally Wells, 257 F.3d 1132; Callaghan, 130
F.3d 906.
120
See Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 919 n.19 (“[T]he monolith is private speech expressing the views
of the Eagles and not speech the County itself has uttered in furtherance of ofﬁcial government
business.”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991) (rejecting an earlier holding because
the previous court did not analyze the issue in question).
121

/GDEN, 297 F.3d at 1004–05.
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speech of its donors rather than that of the city.122 However, a thorough analysis of
these factors demonstrates the speech in question constitutes governmental, not
private speech.123

-ISAPPLYING THE Wells Factors in Ogden
In discussing the ﬁrst factor, the /GDEN court focused on the actual text of
the Ten Commandments monument.124 The ﬁrst factor, however, looks to the
central purpose of the PROGRAM IN WHICH THE SPEECH IS LOCATED, not the purpose of the
speech content.125 As the /GDEN court noted, the court should look to the Knights
decision for clariﬁcation in applying the four factors.126 In Knights, this factor did
not turn on the donor’s purpose for its donation, but on the government’s purpose
for accepting and recognizing the donation.127 Similarly, the /GDEN court should
have focused on the city’s purpose for the acceptance and display of permanent
monuments and historical markers on the municipal grounds, not merely the
purpose of the text inscribed on one such monument.128
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit focused on the text of the Ten Commandments
monument in its analysis of the third factor, the identity of the literal speaker.129 The
122

Id. at 1006.

123

0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1176–77 (McConnell, J., dissenting).

124

/GDEN, 297 F.3d at 1004.

125

Caroline Mala Corbin, -IXED 3PEECH 7HEN 3PEECH IS "OTH 0RIVATE AND 'OVERNMENTAL, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 633 (2008); e.g., Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141 (“the central purpose of the . . .
program”) (quoting Knights, 203 F.3d at 1093); Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298
F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2002) (“the ‘central purpose’ of the project”); Ariz. Life Coalition, Inc.
v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008) (“the central ‘purpose’ of the program in which the
speech in question occurs”) (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. Dept. of
Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618–19 (4th Cir. 2002)).
126

/GDEN, 297 F.3d at 1005 n.5.

127

Knights, 203 F.3d at 1093 (considering the central purpose of the “enhanced underwriting
program” and not the donor’s desire to promote the Ku Klux Klan). In Knights, a state-owned
radio station accepted donations and in return, would make announcements using the donors’
“logograms, slogan, and product summaries.” Id. at 1094 n.9. The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) tried to
make a donation in order to receive on-air recognition. Id. at 1089. The state denied acceptance,
and the KKK sued for a free speech violation. Id. at 1089–90. While discussing the ﬁrst factor, the
Knights court explained the central purpose of the program was “not to promote the views of the
donors, but to acknowledge” the donors for their actions. Id. at 1093.
128

Brief of Amicus Curiae International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n in Support of Petitioners
at 19, Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum (0LEASANT 'ROVE )))), 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008) (No.
07-7665), 2008 WL 2550618 [hereinafter Int’l Brief ] (“[T]he essential question is not what the
donors of a monument had in mind, but rather, what was the city’s purpose in agreeing to display
the monument.”); see Knights, 203 F.3d at 1093 (analyzing the overall purpose of the aggregate
decisions to accept or reject funds). In Wells, only one display existed; therefore, the court did not
need to distinguish between the actual speech and the program in which the speech was located. See
Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141–42.
129

/GDEN, 297 F.3d at 1004.
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Eagles did speak by selecting the text and look of the monument they donated.130
However, the government was the literal speaker in question, as it selected and
displayed several monuments on the municipal grounds; the Ten Commandments
merely constituted a portion of that overall speech.131 The United States Supreme
Court has, on multiple occasions, recognized that a compilation of speech of third
parties qualiﬁes, in itself, as a form of speech.132 The display of monuments on the
municipal grounds in question constitutes such a compilation, which makes the
Ogden city government the literal speaker.133 The /GDEN court’s misapplication of
two Wells factors resulted in a holding that the Ten Commandments monument
constituted private speech.134

!PPLYING THE &OUR &ACTORS TO 0LEASANT 'ROVE
The 0LEASANT 'ROVE ) court relied on the /GDEN court’s misapplication of the
factors instead of applying the Wells test itself.135 As such, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit should have conducted a proper application of
the Wells factors to the facts of 0LEASANT 'ROVE ).136
The ﬁrst Wells factor that should have been applied is the central purpose of
the program in which the questioned speech occurs.137 Pleasant Grove maintained
Pioneer Park and its displays with the goal of promoting the city’s pioneer heritage.138 The city carried out its purpose by accepting only permanent monuments

130

Id.

131

See Knights, 203 F.3d at 1093–94 (recognizing the government was the literal speaker by
selecting which donations it would accept and deny); Corbin, supra note 125, at 633 (“Here, the
government acts less like an author or host and more like an editor or moderator exercising control
over the agenda.”).
132
%G, Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) (“Although
programming decisions often involve the compilation of the speech of third parties, the decisions
nonetheless constitute communicative acts.”) (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995) (“[A] speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection
simply by combining multifarious voices . . . or by failing to generate, as an original matter, each
item featured in the communication.”)).
133

Corbin, supra note 125, at 629–30 (“In such cases, the literal speaker might be considered
the one who owns the sign or the property on which the message is displayed.”).
134

Int’l Brief, supra note 128, at 19; see /GDEN, 297 F.3d at 1004–05.

135

3EE 0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1176–77 (McConnell, J., dissenting) (advocating
overruling of /GDEN and reapplying the four-factor Wells test).
136

See id.; Brief of the Foundation for Free Expression as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 11, 0LEASANT 'ROVE ))), 128 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 07-7665), 2008 WL 2511783 [hereinafter
Found. Brief ] (“When applied correctly to 0LEASANT 'ROVE, the presence of government speech is
evident.”).
137

Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141.

138

Brief of Appellee at 3, 0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d 1044 (No. 06-4057), 2006 U.S. 10th Cir.
Briefs LEXIS 524.
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directly relating to the history of Pleasant Grove or donated by groups with longstanding ties to the community.139 These requirements advance the city’s central
purpose for maintaining Pioneer Park, the promotion of its history.140 This factor
weighs in favor of governmental speech.141
The second factor of the Wells test is the amount of editorial control over
the content of the speech.142 Little question exists as to the result of this factor;
Pleasant Grove asserted no control over the content of the Ten Commandments
monument.143 This factor weighs in favor of the speech being private.144
The third Wells factor focuses on the identity of the literal speaker.145 Here,
Pleasant Grove is the literal speaker, as it selected and displayed the historical
monuments and artifacts at Pioneer Park.146 Each monument and artifact indeed
had its own message, but the government became the literal speaker when it selected
and combined them all into the single collection promoting its history.147
In the ﬁnal factor, the court should have assessed who bore ultimate
responsibility for the content of the speech.148 Little doubt exists that Pleasant
Grove held responsibility; once the Eagles turned the Ten Commandments

139

0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1047.

140

Int’l Brief, supra note 128, at 19; see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681, 691 (2005)
(recognizing Texas’ legitimate purpose of promoting “its political and legal history” by displaying
Ten Commandments among other monuments and markers celebrating the “people, ideals, and
events that compose Texan identity”).
141

Int’l Brief, supra note 128, at 19.

142

Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141. The factors of the Wells test that focus on content of the speech could
focus instead on the content of one of Pleasant Grove’s other privately-donated monuments, e.g.,
the September Eleven ﬁreﬁghters, but the facts surrounding the Ten Commandments monument
are more developed in the record. 3EE 0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1047–48.
143
0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1180 (Tacha, C.J., responding to dissents); /GDEN, 297 F.3d at
1004. But see Found. Brief, supra note 136, at 11 (arguing Pleasant Grove exercises editorial control
over the content by choosing whether to accept or reject items based on their content).
144

3EE /GDEN, 297 F.3d at 1004–05. But see Found. Brief, supra note 136, at 11 (arguing this
factor weighs in favor of government speech).
145

Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141.

146

Int’l Brief, supra note 128, at 12; see Knights, 203 F.3d at 1094 n.9 (recognizing announcements primarily indentiﬁed the individual sponsors, but noting the selection and dissemination of
the collateral speech makes the government the literal speaker).
147
Found. Brief, supra note 136, at 12 (“The amalgamation of monuments, while containing
private expression, is a collective ‘whole.’ The city is not parroting the words engraved on individual
monuments, but through the completed exhibit says: ‘This is our pioneer-era history.’”).
148

Wells, 257 F.3d at 1142.
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monument over to the city, all property rights transferred with it.149 At that point,
the city could have done whatever it wanted with the monument.150
Therefore, a close analysis of the Wells test demonstrates at least three of the
four factors weigh in favor of governmental speech.151 If the panel had conducted
this analysis, it would have concluded the Ten Commandments monument
constitutes governmental speech.152 Doing so would have negated the panel’s need
for the forum analysis, as the First Amendment allows government entities to
speak, including or excluding any speech it sees ﬁt, subject to other constitutional
provisions.153

Free Speech Forum Analysis
Because the Tenth Circuit did conclude the privately-donated monuments on
display at Pioneer Park constitute the private speech of its donors, it then engaged
in a forum analysis to determine the degree to which the government could deny
public access.154 In conducting the forum analysis, the courts consider both the
government property at issue and the type of access sought.155 In determining
the relevant forum, the Tenth Circuit correctly indentiﬁed the “permanent
monuments in the city park” as the relevant forum.156

149

0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1177 (McConnell, J., dissenting).

150

Id.; SEE /GDEN, 297 F.3d at 1005 (“After the City acquired title to the Monument, however,
presumably the City could have sold, re-gifted, modiﬁed, or even destroyed the Monument at
will.”).
151

See supra notes 137–50 and accompanying text; cf. Found. Brief, supra note 136, at 4–15
(arguing all four factors weigh in favor of governmental speech). But see Corbin, supra note 125,
at 628 (arguing the United States Supreme Court should create a third category, “mixed speech,”
which exists when not all factors point exclusively to government or private speech).
152
0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1176–77 (McConnell, J., dissenting); Tebbe, supra note 25, at
1334 (“And Judge McConnell, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, argued powerfully
that the existing displays constituted government speech, from which the city could excluded [sic]
Summum.”).
153

0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1177 (McConnell, J., dissenting) (citing Downs v. L.A.
Uniﬁed Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Simply because the government opens
its mouth to speak does not give every outside individual or group a First Amendment right to
play ventriloquist.”)); see infra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on
government speech).
154

0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1050.

155

Id. The type of access refers to the type of speech an individual wishes to communicate on
the property, e.g., leaﬂet, concert, or permanent monument. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def.
& Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985). The general public’s access to view or hear the speech is
not relevant to this analysis. See id.
156
0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1172 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (“Because the government
property involved in [0LEASANT 'ROVE )] consists of the city park[], and the access sought is the
installation of permanent monuments, the panel correctly concluded that the relevant forum
consists of permanent monuments in the city park[].”).
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Once a court indentiﬁes the relevant forum, it then determines into which of
the three 0ERRY categories it falls.157 At this crucial point in the analysis, the court
took a misstep.158 After identifying the forum as the “permanent monuments
in the city park,” the court prescribed the entire city park as the forum to be
classiﬁed.159
The Tenth Circuit asserted it could identify the narrower forum in step one
(permanent monuments in the city park) and classify the broader forum in step
two (the entire city park).160 However, the forum identiﬁed in the ﬁrst step is the
same forum to be classiﬁed in the second step of the analysis.161 Identifying the
forum in step one of the analysis and classifying a broader forum in step two
leads to an illogical conclusion; i.e., the public has a right to erect permanent
monuments in all public parks.162
The court, then, should have categorized the “permanent monuments in the
city park.”163 Traditional public fora consist of places which have forever been
used by the public for speech, discussion, and assembly.164 The public has used

157

0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1050.

158

0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1172 (Lucero, J., dissenting).

159

Id. By re-characterizing the forum as the entire city park in the second step, the Tenth
Circuit easily classiﬁed it as a traditional public forum, as the United States Supreme Court has
characterized public streets and parks as quintessential public fora. Id.; see Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
160
0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1051 (“[T]he fact that Summum seeks access to particular
means of communication (i.e., the display of a monument) is relevant in deﬁning the forum, but
it does not determine the nature of that forum.”) (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (“Having
identiﬁed the forum . . . we must decide whether it is nonpublic or public in nature.”)).
161

See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801, 805 (identifying the forum as “CFC [a charity drive]
and its attendant literature” and classifying it instead of the federal workplace in which the charity
drive was held); 0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 46–47 (identifying the forum as “internal mail system” and
classifying it instead of the public school in which the mail system was located); /GDEN, 297 F.3d at
1002 (identifying the forum as “permanent monuments on the lawn of the Ogden City municipal
building” and classifying it instead of the municipal grounds on which the monuments stood).
162

0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1172 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (“In [0ERRY], a case which the
panel cites, the [United States] Supreme Court ﬁrst narrowed the forum to the mail delivery system
within a school, and only then did it consider the nature of this forum; it did not simply conclude
that schools in general are public fora.”); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (“[F]orum analysis is not
completed merely by identifying the government property at issue.”); see Graff v. City of Chi., 9
F.3d 1309, 1314 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[N]o person has a constitutional right to erect or maintain a
structure on the public way. . . . ‘If there were, our traditional public forums, such as our public
parks, would be cluttered with all manner of structures.’”) (quoting Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc.
v. Chi., 917 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cir. 1990)).
163

0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1173 (Lucero, J., dissenting).

164

0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 45.
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parks as such for longer than can be remembered—but for speech, concerts, and
protests—not for erecting permanent monuments.165 The monuments in the
park, therefore, do not constitute a traditional public forum.166
Because parks do not constitute traditional public fora for the display of
permanent monuments, the court should have determined if Pioneer Park
represents a designated public forum or a nonpublic forum for the display of
permanent monuments.167 Public property remains a nonpublic forum if the
government does not allow free speech access on the property.168 A nonpublic
forum will become a designated public forum when the government intentionally
opens a nonpublic forum for public speech.169
A complication arises, however, when the government allows some, but not
all, speech on a piece of public property.170 How the government opens the forum
determines which of the two forum types it maintains.171 When the government
makes the forum generally available to the public, it creates a designated forum.172
If, however, the government only allows selective access for some individuals,
as opposed to general access for the public, the forum remains nonpublic
(characterized as a limited public forum).173

165
,UBAVITCH #HABAD, 917 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Public parks are certainly
quintessential public forums where free speech is protected, but the Constitution neither provides,
nor has it ever been construed to mandate, that any person or group be allowed to erect structures at
will.”); Tucker v. City of Fairﬁeld, Ohio, 398 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Courts have generally
refused to protect on First Amendment grounds the placement of objects on public property where
the objects are permanent or otherwise not easily moved.”); 0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1173
(Lucero, J., dissenting) (“In short, a park is a traditional public forum when access is sought to it for
temporary speech and assembly, such as protests or concerts, but it hardly follows that parks have
been held open since time immemorial for the installation of statues . . . .”).
166

0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1175 (McConnell, J., dissenting) (“[N]either the logic nor the
language of these [United States] Supreme Court decisions suggests that city parks must be open to
the erection of ﬁxed and permanent monuments expressing the sentiments of private parties.”).
167

Id. at 1173 (Lucero, J., dissenting).

168

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.

169

Id.

170

Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679.

171

Id.

172

0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 45; e.g., Eagon v. City of Elk City, 72 F.3d 1480 (10th Cir. 1996)
(granting plaintiff access for temporary display in park open to the public for such displays during
“Christmas in the Park” event).
173
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679; see supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text (explaining that
selective access creates a limited public forum, a subset of nonpublic fora).
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Pleasant Grove did not grant access to the general public to its park for
erection of permanent monuments.174 Instead, Pleasant Grove had a system in
place that permitted certain individuals meeting certain speciﬁcations to propose
privately-donated displays.175 Pleasant Grove required all permanent displays in
Pioneer Park pertain to the community’s history or be donated by groups with
long-standing community ties.176 If a proposal met those speciﬁcations and the city
council determined that such an addition would be agreeable to the city, then the
individual could donate, and the city would accept, the permanent monument.177
Furthermore, the city has only accepted a handful of these privately-donated
monuments in sixty years, which illustrates selective access.178
Therefore, if the court must conduct a forum analysis, the City of Pleasant
Grove opened Pioneer Park for selective access to individual speakers, which
created a limited public forum.179 As the United States Supreme Court has treated
limited public fora as nonpublic, the court should have then determined whether
it considered the exclusions reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.180 In denying
Summum’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court applied this
test and decided Pleasant Grove’s policy met the standard.181

174

0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1174 (Lucero, J., dissenting).

175

0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1047.

176

Id.

177

Id.; SEE 0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 47 (concluding when principals grant limited access to school
mailboxes by their own discretion, the nonpublic forum is not transformed into a designated public
forum).
178
0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1174 (Lucero, J., dissenting); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, 0LEASANT 'ROVE ))), 128 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 07-665), 2008
WL 2521267 [hereinafter U.S. Brief ] (recognizing the city only accepted eleven privately-donated
displays during the park’s sixty-year existence).
179

See supra notes 114–53 and accompanying text (arguing the speech in question constitutes
government speech, which removes the need for a forum analysis); 0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d
at 1174 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (recognizing Pleasant Grove opened the park for selective access,
creating a limited public forum). But see Dolan, supra note 73, at 111–18 (arguing limited public
fora where government has a subjective expressive purpose and makes selective choices should
instead be classiﬁed as “special public purpose” fora and should be treated as government speech).
180

Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001); see supra notes 69–73
and accompanying text (demonstrating courts treat limited public fora as nonpublic fora).
181

0LEASANT 'ROVE ), 483 F.3d at 1050. However, Judge Lucero recognized the trial court may
have erred in this regard and urged for arguments on this issue. 0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1174
(Lucero, J., dissenting).
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Implications of the United States Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit’s decision focused on the Ten Commandments displayed
in Pleasant Grove, Utah.182 The result of this decision, however, put governments
at all levels in a difﬁcult position.183 By classifying monuments in a city park
as a traditional public forum, the Tenth Circuit gave governments two choices:
(1) allow permanent monuments inside the park (including any created by the
government and any and all created by individuals), or (2) allow no monuments
of any kind.184
For example, the Tenth Circuit’s holding in 0LEASANT 'ROVE ) forced the City
of Casper, Wyoming into this troubling dichotomy.185 The city government owns
a city park, the Historical Monument Plaza, which houses several monuments
and plaques, some privately-funded, recognizing the history of the city, state,
and nation.186 Fred Phelps, the Kansas pastor of the Westboro Baptist Church,
began pressuring the city to erect a monument in the park condemning Matthew
Shepard, a Casper native killed in 1998.187 Under the Tenth Circuit’s holding,
Casper will have to remove all monuments from the park (which would destroy
the park’s purpose) or allow Pastor Phelps (and any other person who so wishes)
to place his monument on the property.188

182

0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1175 (McConnell, J., dissenting).

183

Id. at 1174 (Lucero, J., dissenting).

184

Id. at 1175 (McConnell, J., dissenting). It should be noted, however, that the second option
only remains available if a court considers the exclusion of all monuments narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest. 0ERRY, 460 U.S. at 45; see Lopez, supra note 79, at 219–20
(arguing a blanket ban on permanent monuments would constitute a justiﬁable time, place, and
manner restriction that is narrowly drawn to satisfy a compelling state interest).
185

Brief Amicus Curiae of the Cities of Casper, Wyoming et al. in Support of the Petition at 1,
0LEASANT 'ROVE ))), 128 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 07-665), 2007 WL 4618401 [hereinafter Casper Brief ].
186

Id.

187

Id. at 2–3. In 1998, two men met Matthew Shepard, a gay University of Wyoming student,
and lured him from a bar, tied him to a split-rail fence, bludgeoned him in the head with a pistol,
and left him to die in the Wyoming cold. CNN – Suspect Pleads Guilty in Beating Death of Gay
College Student (Apr. 5, 1999), http://www.cnn.com/US/ 9904/05/gay.attack.trail.02/ (last visited
Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter CNN]; Matthew Shepard Foundation: Matthew’s Life, http://www.
matthewshepard.org/site/PageServer?pagename=mat_Matthews_Life (last visited Nov. 17, 2008)
[hereinafter Foundation]. Matthew Shepard was born in Casper, Wyoming, where his family held
his funeral. Foundation. Pastor Fred Phelps began his involvement with Matthew Shepard and the
City of Casper when he organized an anti-gay protest outside Shepard’s funeral. CNN.
188

Casper Brief, supra note 185, at 13.
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Pleasant Grove and Casper represent just the beginning.189 The Tenth Circuit’s
decision would effectively impact all governmental entities—from small towns to
the federal government.190 Allow one monument, allow them all.191

Implications of the United States Supreme Court Decision
After hearing arguments on appeal in 0LEASANT 'ROVE ))), the United States
Supreme Court should reverse the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit.192 The Court should conclude that selection and denial of privatelydonated monuments amounts to an act of government speech.193 This would allow
governments to make aesthetic and content-based decisions when beautifying
their properties.194 Individual citizens could challenge choices the government
makes via the democratic process or through other constitutional provisions.195
189

Id. The City of Santa Fé faces a broader type of harm than Casper:
La Villa Real de la Santa Fé de San Francisco de Asis (Santa Fé) was founded in 1610
and is world-renowned for its long history and its eponymous trail, railroad, and
architectural style. Santa Fé celebrates these glories with permanent monuments and
sculptures in its parks. Many of the monuments and works of art were donated by
private parties, accepted by the City, and proudly displayed in its public spaces for
the reason just described. The decision below, if allowed to stand, will force the City
to choose between denuding its public spaces of artwork reﬂecting its history and
culture or allowing those public spaces to be inundated with hundreds of permanent
displays furthering private expression.

Id. at 4.
190

Id. at 1; Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Petitioners at 1, 0LEASANT 'ROVE ))), 128 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 07-665), 2008 WL 2550616 [hereinafter
Va. Brief ] (arguing for fourteen states and Puerto Rico that the United States Supreme Court reverse
the lower decision and allow state governments to control their properties); U.S. Brief, supra note
178, at 1–2 (“National parklands contain thousands of privately designed or funded commemorative
objects, including the Statue of Liberty, a great deal of the public sculpture in Washington, D.C.,
and all but one of the 1324 monuments, markers, tablets, and plaques on display at Vicksburg
National Military Park.”).
191
0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1175 (McConnell, J., dissenting) (“Every park in the country
that has accepted a VFW memorial is now a public forum for the erection of permanent ﬁxed
monuments; they must either remove the war memorials or brace themselves for an inﬂux of
clutter.”); Lorenz, supra note 4, at 650.
192

Va. Brief, supra note 190, at 1; U.S. Brief, supra note 178, at 10.

193

Va. Brief, supra note 190, at 4. Regardless of the conclusion of this decision, an acceptance,
clariﬁcation, or rejection of the four-factor test as applied by several circuits will provide guidance
to courts and practitioners alike. 3EE !RIZ ,IFE, 515 F.3d at 965, cert. denied, No. 07-1366, 2008
WL 1926739 (Oct. 6, 2008) (looking for guidance from the United States Supreme Court on the
four-factor test).
194
U.S. Brief, supra note 178, at 11 (“[A government] ‘may legitimately’ seek ‘to communicate to
others an ofﬁcial view as to proper appreciation of history, state ride, and individualism.’”) (quoting
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)); Brief of Amici Curiae American Humanist Ass’n
et al. in Support of Neither Party at 7, 0LEASANT 'ROVE ))), 128 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 07-665), 2008 WL
2511782.
195

U.S. Brief, supra note 178, at 12 (“‘If the citizenry objects’ to what its government chooses
to say, ‘newly elected ofﬁcials later could espouse some different or contrary position.’”) (quoting
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If the Court holds otherwise, it should classify a public park as a nonpublic
forum for the display of permanent monuments, or, if the government allows
selective access, a limited public forum.196 This holding would allow governments
at all levels to make content-based decisions, but still force them to follow a
standard of reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.197 Cities like Pleasant Grove
and Casper could set standards for private displays, e.g., requiring a historical
signiﬁcance.198 Government ofﬁcials would still be prohibited from making
arbitrary decisions, and individuals could still challenge exclusions in the court
system.199

CONCLUSION
In deciding 3UMMUM V 0LEASANT 'ROVE #ITY, the Tenth Circuit sitting in panel
made two crucial errors.200 First, it relied on a previous Tenth Circuit decision
which incorrectly applied the Wells four-factor test to determine the display in
question constitutes private, rather than government speech.201 After doing so, the
panel conducted a forum analysis, in which it incorrectly classiﬁed monuments
in a park as a traditional public forum instead of a nonpublic forum, subjecting
the city’s actions to stricter scrutiny than necessary.202 The court should have
characterized Pioneer Park as a limited public forum and applied the lesser
standard of reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality to Pleasant Grove’s exclusion
of Summum’s proposed monument.203 Instead, the court held all public parks

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)). Moreover, Professor
Norton explained numerous other protections the United States affords citizens when dealing with
governmental speech:
[Government speech] may still, for example, contravene the Constitution’s
Establishment or Equal Protection Clauses if it endorses religion or furthers racial
discrimination . . . [and] may in some settings violate constitutional constraints like
the Guarantee Clause or statutory limitations like state and federal laws prohibiting
the use of government resources for campaign speech.
Helen Norton, 4HE -EASURE OF 'OVERNMENT 3PEECH )DENTIFYING %XPRESSIONS 3OURCE, 88 B.U. L. REV.
587, 600 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
196

Lorenz, supra note 4, at 649.

197

Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 916.

198

0LEASANT 'ROVE )), 499 F.3d at 1174 (Lucero, J., dissenting).

199

Id.

200

See supra notes 114–99 and accompanying text.

201

See supra notes 114–53 and accompanying text.

202

See supra notes 154–73 and accompanying text.

203

See supra notes 174–81 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss1/10

24

Tolin: Constitutional Law - Open the Floodgate to Public Parks: The Tent

CASE NOTE

2009

333

open for cluttering by any and all individuals wishing to add their own permanent
monuments.204 The United States Supreme Court, therefore, should reverse the
Tenth Circuit and allow governments to reasonably control the look of their
public properties.205

204

See supra notes 182–91 and accompanying text.

205

See supra notes 192–99 and accompanying text.
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